O UFFDEFESA há algum tempo tem alertado, em artigos publicados em periódicos, apresentações no CSD e inúmeros Encontros e Simpósios Acadêmicos ou patrocinados pelo MD,   para a relevância e urgência de se discutir e promover profundas modificações na estrutura de defesa do país. As instituições atuais não dão conta dos enormes desafios da defesa e, adicionalmente, não existe um corpo profissional habilitado a cuidar da logística de defesa, principalmente no que diz repeito ao desenvolvimento de tecnologias, inovação e aquisição de sistemas de armas complexos. O resultado é que a base industrial de defesa brasileira está se desintegrando. Este é o assunto  que mais aflige os Ministérios da Defesa em todo o mundo e que tem motivado profundas reformas em todos os países industrializados e, até mesmo, nos EUA, como mostra este relatório do Senado Americano. 

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? A Compendium of Views by Leading Experts.

As questôes apresentadas aos especialistas são reproduzidas abaixo devido à sua enorme relevância e oportunidade tendo em vista a atual situação brasileira.

Os especialistas também foram incentivados a abordarem qualquer outro aspecto não relacionado a essas questões que eles considerassem relevantes.

Culture & Accountability

1. What steps would you recommend to change the culture within the acquisition workforce to increase cost consciousness and pursue affordability as an operational requirement?
2. What steps would you recommend to develop the core competencies of the acquisition workforce and make it more capable of obtaining better value for the taxpayer—becoming as skilled a buyer as private industry is a seller?
3. What is your assessment of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF)? Do you believe that the DAWDF should be continued? Would you recommend any changes to the structure or function of the DAWDF?
4. How can the DOD better empower PMs and PEOs to make sound program management decisions and ensure accountability? Should the DOD restructure how PMs and PEOs are transitioned in and out of programs in relation to key decision points?
5. Do you believe that the qualification requirements established by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) are working, or would you recommend additional requirements or better enforcement of existing requirements enhance the performance of the acquisition workforce? What steps would you recommend to improve the qualifications of acquisition personnel holding key leadership positions or otherwise ensure that members of the acquisition workforce are fully qualified to meet their responsibilities?
6. What steps would you recommend to help ensure that top performers within the acquisition workforce are rewarded for their performance and empowered to manage programs with success?
7. What steps would you recommend to improve the recruitment, hiring, and retention of talented and capable mid- and senior-level executives to fill the growing number of highlevel vacancies within the DOD acquisition workforce?

Acquisition Policy

1. What changes would you recommend to the statutes, regulations, and policies governing DOD acquisition of major weapon systems to ensure that major weapon systems are delivered on time, at a reasonable cost, and provide the needed capability? For any recommended changes, please specify the statute, regulation, or policy and the precise change that you would recommend.
2. Do you see the need for any change to the current acquisition chain of command for our largest major defense acquisition programs, under which program managers report to program executive officers, who report to service acquisition executives, who report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics? What changes if any would you recommend to the role of the service chiefs in this process, as outlined in section 2547 of title 10, United States Code?
3. What changes if any would you recommend to how DOD tests major weapon systems to ensure that they will be delivered to combatant commanders on time, at a reasonable cost, and with the required capability? Do you support the concept of “fly before you buy” for major defense acquisition programs?
4. What changes would you recommend to ensure that DOD better addresses concurrency risk in the design, development, test, and production of major weapons systems to help ensure that they are not being procured while important design and/or testing activities are still ongoing? What is your view of the use of the requirement for prototypes, and where appropriate, competitive prototypes? What steps would you recommend to improve the transition of new technologies into major weapon systems?
5. What changes would you recommend to the process by which DOD identifies and mitigates risk (including but not limited to technological-, integration-, and manufacturing-risk) early in the lifecycle of major weapon systems? Is the Department making appropriate use of technology readiness levels and similar measures in the acquisition process?
6. What changes would you recommend to ensure that better accounts for full life-cycle costs, including the operation and sustainment costs, in the acquisition of major weapon systems?
7. To what extent should the DOD encourage the use of “time-certain development,” “spiral development” and “incremental acquisition” strategies to procure major weapons systems? Should the acquisition process itself be shortened to reduce the decision-making cycle time